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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the concept of constitutional democratic legitimacy and the 
democratic legitimacy of New Zealand’s constitution in particular. In so doing, it 
considers Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional theory in We the People, Volume 1: 
Foundations and the criticisms it has provoked to develop a theoretical framework of 
three constitutional models (monism, dualism and rights foundationalism) that can be 
used to assess constitutional democratic legitimacy. It then utilises this framework as a 
tool for analysing New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, observing that New 
Zealand has a particularly sophisticated monist constitution, noting s 268 of the 
Electoral Act 1993 and the adoption of MMP voting as particular institutional examples. 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that New Zealand’s constitution may still be critiqued in 
terms of its claim to democratic legitimacy through the alternative perspectives of 
monism (focusing on remaining flaws in New Zealand’s electoral system), dualism 
(focusing on the absence of avenues for binding public constitutional participation) and 
rights foundationalism (focusing on the constitutional place of the Treaty of Waitangi). 
Alternative suggestions for reform are offered. 
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I Introduction 
 
The underlying aim of this paper is to explore the democratic legitimacy of New 
Zealand’s current constitutional structure and consider changes that could be made to 
preserve and enhance its legitimacy moving forward. The motivation for this exploration 
stems from the conviction that for a constitution to be meaningfully, richly democratic, it 
ought to be one that “We the People” can endorse, cultivate, and meaningfully participate 
within.  
 
Simply, reference to a constitution is reference to the set of norms, principles or legal 
rules that create, structure or define the limits of government power,1 or “the set of factors 
that determines who exercises public power and how they exercise it.”2 In this sense, all 
states have constitutions.3 However, not all constitutions are necessarily democratically 
legitimate. 
 
‘Democracy’ derives from the Greek demokratia, translating literally to rule by the 
people.4 From this translation, the concept can be understood as involving values of self-
determination or self-government.5  The United Nations General Assembly has affirmed 
that: “…democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of the people 
to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems…”6  
 
Democracy expressed at this level of abstraction is generally taken for granted as a 
desirable constitutional principle. However, it is difficult to categorically define what 
makes a system democratic in practice, and different constitutional arrangements across 
the globe can be characterised as having varying degrees of democratic legitimacy 
  
1  Wil Waluchow “Constitutionalism” (10 January 2001) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 ed) Edward N Zalto (ed) <plato.stanford.edu>.  
2  Matthew Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 565. 
3  Waluchow, above n 1. 
4  Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, London, 1999) at 4. 
5  See Joel Colón-Ríos “New Zealand’s Constitutional Crisis” (2011) 24 NZULR 448 at 451. 
6  Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the 
promotion of democratization GA Res 64/155, A/Res/64/155 (2009). 
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according to variable indicia. Furthermore, there may be a distinction between the 
concepts of democracy and of constitutional democratic legitimacy, so that although a 
particular constitutional regime adheres to democratic practice in its electoral system and 
ordinary day-to-day law making, it may nevertheless involve a democratic deficit in its 
constitutional arrangements generally.7 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranks 165 countries based on five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture.8 In 2012, New Zealand ranked 5th on this 
Index.9 Thus, in global terms, New Zealand appears to be a world leader in its 
commitment to democracy. However, despite New Zealand’s general commitment to 
democracy and its relative success in implementing it, this paper will argue that there 
may be aspects of our constitutional structure that are wanting in democratic terms.  
 
To advance this argument, in Part II, Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional theory from We 
The People, Volume 1: Foundations10 and the criticisms it has provoked will be explored 
to develop a theoretical framework of constitutional models through which constitutional 
democratic legitimacy may be assessed. Part III considers where New Zealand fits within 
that framework, concluding that New Zealand has a particularly sophisticated monist 
constitution, referencing s 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 and the adoption of an MMP 
electoral system as particular examples. Part IV however notes democratic imperfections 
within New Zealand’s constitution, and offers suggestions for reform, from the 
alternative perspectives of monism, dualism and rights foundationalism, focusing 
particularly on, respectively, remaining flaws in New Zealand’s electoral system, the 
absence of avenues for binding public constitutional engagement, and the constitutional 
place of the Treaty of Waitangi. Part V concludes that while New Zealand’s constitution 
  
7  See Joel Colón-Ríos Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the question of constituent 
power (Routledge, London, 2012), at 6-7 and ch 3. 
8  The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index 2012: Democracy at a standstill (The Economist, 
14 March 2013) at 1. 
9  The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index 2011, above n 8 at 3. 
10  Bruce Ackerman We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 1993).  
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has strong claims to democratic legitimacy in monist terms, improvements ought to be 
made to truly enrich the democratic legitimacy of New Zealand’s constitution. 
 
II Ackerman’s Constitutional Theory and Criticisms 
A Introduction 
We The People, Volume 1: Foundations is the first volume in a three-installment series 
providing an extensive analysis of the constitutional history of the United States of 
America over the two centuries following the Founding.11 This paper will primarily focus 
on Ackerman’s constitutional theory as described in Foundations. In this volume, 
Ackerman describes the American constitution as a dualist democracy, using other 
constitutional models, in particular monism and rights foundationalism, to contrast and 
show the superiority of a dualist constitution.  
 
Ackerman’s analysis is predominantly focused on the United States context. However, 
this section will explain the major models Ackerman refers to, and his case in favour of 
dualism, in more generalised terms. In addition, it will raise some of the many criticisms 
Ackerman’s theory has generated. This approach is taken to show the utility of 
Ackerman’s theory for this paper, which is not to provide a single standard of 
constitutional democratic legitimacy, embodied in Ackerman’s dualist democracy, by 
which the legitimacy of other regimes may be measured. Rather, both by its reference to a 
range of constitutional models and by the criticism it has ignited, the utility of 
Ackerman’s theory lies in its facilitation of a conversation about how to define 
democratic legitimacy in constitutional terms. From this conversation, a theoretical 
framework of alternative constitutional models and their respective claims to democratic 
legitimacy begins to emerge which can be used to analyse the democratic legitimacy of 
alternative constitutional regimes. Part III will use this theoretical framework to assess 
  
11  Ackerman Foundations, above n 10; Bruce Ackerman We the People, Volume 2: Transformations 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass) 1998); Bruce Ackerman We the People, Volume 3: The 
Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass) 2014). 
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the democratic legitimacy of New Zealand’s constitution, and as a means of providing 
alternative suggestions for constitutional reform in New Zealand. 
 
B Dualist Democracy 
Ackerman begins his case in favour of dualist democracy by describing its conceptual 
foundations. He states that within a dualist constitutional democracy, there is a distinction 
between two types of lawmaking decisions that can be legitimately made: decisions made 
by ‘the People’, and decisions made by the government.12 The ‘dualism’ of Ackerman’s 
dualist democracy thus comes from this idea of two-track lawmaking.13 
 
Government decision-making, according to this framework, is the daily ‘normal 
lawmaking’ authorised by and kept in check through the electoral process.14 However, 
even when this normal lawmaking is functioning well, “the dualist Constitution prevents 
elected politicians from exaggerating their authority.”15 This is because standing above 
and superior to ordinary lawmaking is ‘higher law’. 
 
‘Higher lawmaking’ within Ackerman’s dualist framework is, in broad terms, the process 
whereby popular mobilisation around a particular political or constitutional issue gains 
such significant traction with the citizenry that, via some process or other it manifests into 
supreme law.16 The supremacy of this law made by ‘the People’ prevents the electoral 
legitimacy of any given administration from going so far as to authorise that 
administration to overturn, through ordinary lawmaking procedures, decisions reached by 
the People through the higher lawmaking process.17 This seems like a classic account of 
supreme law written constitutions. However, Ackerman’s analysis is unique in that he 
characterises even informal or unlawful ‘amendments’ to the written constitutional 
regime, i.e. those that do not follow formal amendment rules, as nevertheless 
  
12  Ackerman Foundations, above n 10, at 6. 
13  See at 9. 
14  At 6. 
15  At 6. 
16  At 6-7; see also ch 10. 
17  At 6. 
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democratically legitimate if they represent “the considered judgments of the mobilized 
People”.18  
 
There are three moments in American constitutional history that Ackerman considers 
exemplify this higher lawmaking process,19 a view extensively developed over the first 
and second installments of his series but that can only briefly be described here.  
Ackerman’s first constitutional moment is the Founding whereby the United States 
Constitution was originally enacted: despite not adhering to the amendment procedures 
provided by the Articles of Confederation, Ackerman considers that the Constitution thus 
enacted nevertheless had the support of the mobilised People and was therefore legitimate 
(a point Ackerman unfortunately doesn’t argue extensively for).20  
 
Second and third are, respectively, the Reconstruction period following the Civil War and 
the New Deal period arising out of the Great Depression.21 Although these two later 
constitutional moments are distinct in form and substance, it is easiest to understand 
Ackerman’s claim that they each represent higher lawmaking by considering their 
similarities.22 Both periods involved an ‘inter-branch impasse’: one branch of government 
pushing for constitutional reform and one branch resisting:23 the Reconstruction period 
involved conflict between a reformist Congress and a conservative Presidency on the 
topic of the civil and political rights of former slaves; the New Deal period between a 
reformist presidency and a conservative Supreme Court on the topic of government 
intervention in the economy.24 In both instances, this deadlock “forced both sides to 
mobilize their supporters in the country at large”, giving “extraordinary constitutional 
  
18  At 7; at 41-56; at ch 10. 
19  See at 41. 
20  At 41. But see Michael J Klarman “Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce 
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments” (1992) 44 Stanford Law Review 759 at 777-785 for 
a strong critique of Ackerman’s conceptualisation of the Founders as dualist democrats. 
21  At 41-54. 
22  At 48. 
23  See at 49. 
24  At 48. 
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meaning to the next… election.”25 In the elections of both 1866 and 1936, the reformers 
were returned to office by the voters, thus claiming a mandate from the People for their 
reforms.26 In the case of the Reconstruction, the 14th Amendment to the Constitution was 
passed despite not formally meeting Article V amendment procedures;27 in the case of the 
New Deal, the Supreme Court ceased invalidating New Deal legislation on the basis of 
unconstitutionality.28 In both cases, Ackerman considers that these resulting 
constitutional changes were legitimate because they represented the will of the People, 
based on the election outcomes, despite not adhering to formal amendment procedures in 
the United States Constitution.  
 
Ackerman’s focus on ‘constitutional moments’ as representing higher lawmaking is 
innovative, however there are many critiques to be made against it. Fundamentally, 
Ackerman omits to define ‘the People’. A number of issues stem from this omission. For 
example, it is not clear that Ackerman’s constitutional moments did in fact necessarily 
involve the deep, broad popular mobilisation of the People, at least any more than during 
the process of formal constitutional amendments.29 Similarly, as is the case with formal 
constitutional amendments, the initiative for change in Ackerman’s constitutional 
moments essentially came top-down from government, shattering any perception one 
might develop on a first reading of Ackerman’s dualism that this model is about the need 
for constitutional recognition of bottom up political movements initiating from the 
People. While such movements could be accommodated within a dualist theory, it is 
disappointing that this type of bottom-up politics is far from Ackerman’s focus. Rather, 
Ackerman’s constitutional moments appear not all too conceptually dissimilar from 
formal amendment processes, albeit through irregular means.30 
 
  
25  At 48; see also at 53. 
26  At 48. 
27  See at 44-45 and 49-50. 
28  At 49. 
29  See Klarman, above n 20, at 764-775; see also Terrance Sandalow “Abstract Democracy: A Review 
of Ackerman’s We the People” (1992) 9 Const Comment 309 at 318-330. 
30  See Sandalow, above n 29, at 313. 
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Despite these criticisms, largely stemming from Ackerman’s practical application of his 
theory to the United States context, there remains value in the conceptual underpinnings 
of dualist democracy. The idea of ‘higher law’ emanating from the People and acting as a 
legal constraint on ‘normal lawmaking’ to protect the constitutional achievements of the 
People from erosion in times where the People are less politically or constitutionally 
engaged is a powerful democratic alternative to traditional monist understandings of 
democracy.31 
 
C Monistic Democracy 
‘Monism’ is the term used by Ackerman to describe the type of formal democracy we are 
familiar with in New Zealand. At its simplest, the monistic idea of democracy requires 
the grant of full lawmaking authority to the winners of the last general election, so long as 
that election was free and fair.32 Thus monist democracy institutionally translates to 
parliamentary sovereignty.33 Under the monist model, the primary democratic way to 
express dissatisfaction with the decisions of elected lawmakers is to turn them out of 
office at the next election.34  
 
A corollary of the monist conception of democracy, according to Ackerman, is that 
outside of the electoral process itself, “all institutional checks upon the electoral victors 
are presumptively antidemocratic.”35 So, for example, the idea that a court, comprised of 
unelected office-holders, could invalidate legislation made by the elected legislature on 
grounds of unconstitutionality, as is the case in the United States, would be abhorrent to a 
monistic democrat.36 However, Ackerman suggests that there may be room within a 
sophisticated conception of monism for some constitutional checks on elected lawmakers 
that would rebut the antidemocratic presumption by preserving the democratic legitimacy 
  
31  See Ackerman, above n 10, at 10. 
32  Ackerman, above n 10, at 8. 
33  See at 8. 
34  At 8. 
35  At 8. 
36  At 8. 
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of the monist electoral system.37 Examples include restrictions preventing the elected 
legislature from cancelling future elections, or checks that preserve or enhance the 
fairness and integrity of the electoral process itself.38 
 
Ackerman questions the monist assertion that electoral victors are “entitled to rule with 
the full authority of We the People”, pointing out that it is not a given that all statutes 
gaining the support of a legislative majority represent the considered judgment of a 
mobilised majority of citizens.39 Herein lies a major conceptual difference between 
monism and dualism: monist democracies recognise no formal distinction between 
ordinary and constitutional law; the sovereign legislature is authorised, by its electoral 
win, to make whatever law it sees fit.40 In contrast, dualism seeks to reject the monist 
conflation of the will of the People with parliamentary sovereignty. On the dualist view, 
although electoral victory authorises a legislature to make ordinary legislation following 
ordinary legislative processes, particularly onerous ‘higher lawmaking’ procedures must 
be followed for the legislature to claim that its initiative represents the present 
constitutional judgment of the People and that it is thus authorised to alter constitutional 
law previously been laid down by the People.41 
 
This distinction between ordinary and constitutional law is, according to dualist 
democracy, the source of the democratic legitimacy of a judicial power to invalidate 
legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality, and serves to dissolve the 
‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ argument usually advanced to question the democratic 
legitimacy of such a power.42 In the absence of an institution independent of the 
legislature with the power to preserve the higher lawmaking efforts of the People from 
being attacked or undermined, those higher lawmaking efforts would be in vain, as they 
  
37  At 8. 
38  At 8. 
39  At 9. 
40  See at 8-9. 
41  At 7 and 9-10. 
42  At 8-9; see also Klarman, above n 20, at 759-760. 
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could easily be derogated from by ordinary legislative processes.43 Under this view, 
rather than threatening democracy, “the courts serve democracy by protecting the hard-
won principles of a mobilized citizenry against erosion by political elites who have failed 
to gain broad and deep popular support”.44 This aspect of dualism, in contrast to monism, 
helps to distinguish “the will of We the People from the acts of We the Politicians.”45 
 
However, this contention arguably may only be sustained if the dualist higher lawmaking 
system remains responsive to the People of today. Ackerman’s ‘constitutional moments’ 
are few and far between. Part of the reason for this is that Ackerman’s conception of 
higher lawmaking is a particularly onerous process, which he considers a good thing. 
However, these factors together raise the issue of the potential in a dualist system for 
previous generations to rule the present from the grave.46 This raises issues from a 
democratic standpoint: for a constitution to be democratically legitimate as something 
that ‘We the People’ can endorse, it must be today’s people who rule, with their own 
values and problems, not long gone past generations.47 If a court “invalidates today’s 
legislation on the basis of yesterday’s constitutional values” it is “frustrating the People’s 
will, and indefensibly so.”48 
 
Ackerman does not appear troubled by this: if present generations are dissatisfied with 
the constitutional achievements of past generations, they can mobilise to replace previous 
higher law with their own.49 However, given how onerous Ackerman’s idea of higher 
lawmaking is, and the criticisms raised above questioning whether Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments really stem from the People in the ways he asserts, there is a real 
risk under his dualist democracy of present generations being shackled by the 
constitutional judgments of previous generations that they have not chosen and that they 
cannot alter with ease. This raises the potential that for a dualist constitution to be truly 
  
43  At 9-10. 
44  At 10. 
45  At 10. 
46  See Klarman, above n 20, at 765-766 and 792-793. 
47  See Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 451; see also Klarman, above n 20, at 765. 
48  Klarman, above n 20, at 793. 
49  See generally Ackerman, above n 10, at 6-10; see also Klarman, above n 20, at 765. 
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democratically legitimate, it must be less rigid than Ackerman asserts, and offer easier 
routes for the People to periodically consider their constitutional arrangements.50 This in 
turn raises the potential that ordinary and higher lawmaking are not binary poles, but 
rather the differences between them may be a matter of degree. 
 
D Rights Foundationalism 
Monism and dualism each share a commitment to popular sovereignty, or the idea that 
the People are the ultimate authority in a constitutional order; they differ primarily with 
regards to how popular sovereignty is best effected institutionally.51 Rights 
foundationalism, on the other hand, has a different focus. According to it, fundamental 
rights (whatever these may be, an issue that can fragment adherents of this model) come 
before democracy, requiring constitutional protection from erosion by popular politics.52 
On this view, rights exist to trump decisions reached by a majoritarian democratic 
process; it is unjust and illegitimate for a majority to erode the fundamental rights of 
minority groups or individuals by sheltering behind an otherwise legitimate democratic 
process.53 
 
Ackerman provides the post-War German Basic Law as his prime example of a rights 
foundationalist constitution, within which there are fundamental rights that cannot legally 
be revised, regardless of any magnitude of popular support for repeal.54 Article 79(3) 
provides that it is inadmissible to amend certain aspects of the Basic Law, including the 
principles laid down in article 1. Article 1 provides, inter alia, that human dignity is 
inviolable. This “self-conscious act of entrenchment” came about in the aftermath of Nazi 
Germany in an effort to prevent any kind of similar regime from existing in Germany 
again. Now, because there is no legal route to amend those aspects of the Basic Law 
protected by article 79, “if the dominant political majority insisted on repeal, it would be 
  
50  See generally Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 451-452 and 455-456. 
51  Ackerman, above n 10, at 10-11. 
52  At 11. 
53 At 11. 
54  At 15. See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland) art 79. 
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obliged to replace the entire constitution with a new one in its grim determination to 
destroy fundamental human rights.”55  
 
Ackerman conceptualises rights foundationalism and monism as being essentially 
irreconcilable: monism has inherent reservations about the elitism involved in removing 
fundamental questions from the democratic process, while rights foundationalism has 
concerns about the ease with which fundamental rights can be eroded by ordinary 
lawmaking procedures.56 Ackerman sees the dualist two-track system of democratic 
lawmaking as being a compromise between these two poles.57 If fundamental rights have 
been established in law via the higher lawmaking process of popular mobilisation, they 
cannot be eroded through ordinary lawmaking procedures. Nevertheless, in a dualist 
system, fundamental rights are not entirely out of reach of democratic process: they may 
be altered, but only through the onerous higher lawmaking process itself, requiring 
significant popular mobilisation for any alteration of higher principle. Dualism thus 
accommodates the need for greater protections of fundamental principles whilst 
preserving the right of the People to change their mind.58 Under this model, “it is the 
People who are the source of rights; the Constitution does not spell out rights that the 
People must accept.”59 
 
However, the assumptions underlying Ackerman’s position in favour of dualist 
democracy can be critiqued at a normative level from a rights foundationalist type of 
perspective. Much of the appeal of Ackerman’s argument derives from its reliance on 
“commonly held intuitions of popular consent or popular sovereignty, by which the ‘will 
of the People’ is expressed by either a majority or supermajority of the persons who make 
up the polity.”60 The idea that ‘the People’ can mobilise around a particular issue and in 
doing so effect democratically legitimate constitutional change is appealing because of 
  
55  At 15. 
56  At 12. 
57  At 12-13. 
58  At 14. 
59  At 15.  
60  Randy E. Barnett “We the People: Each and Every One” (2014) Yale Law Journal (forthcoming) at 
15. 
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our deep seated assumptions about democracy, our general commitment to the idea that it 
is the People through whom the government obtains authority to govern and to whom the 
government must remain answerable and responsive. However, Randy E. Barnett 
“challenges this majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty as a fiction.”61 He asks 
the oft-overlooked question of how a majority or supermajority of the People, even if 
they are ‘mobilised’, get to speak on behalf of the whole of ‘We the People’ in 
determining constitutional outcomes or change at the expense of the preferences of 
minority groups.62  
 
There may well be compelling answers to this question: for example, it could be argued 
that, given the complexities of modern society, it would be impossible to obtain 
unanimous consent across the polity for any particular constitutional design, and thus the 
judgment of a majority or supermajority of the People is the next best thing, the closest 
we can get to that ideal.63 However one responds to Barnett’s contention, it is one that 
ought to be taken fairly seriously, as it questions the underlying assumptions Ackerman 
relies on in asserting the democratic superiority of dualism, while raising the possibility 
of an alternative definition of constitutional democratic legitimacy that is not based 
purely on popular sovereignty or consent. 
 
Barnett offers such an alternative. He claims that the idea that “first comes rights, then 
comes government” helps explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence of 
unanimous consent.64 For if rights underlie and are protected by a constitution, changes 
that are not unanimously endorsed by the People can nevertheless be legitimate if they 
are constrained by the rights of all.65 To advance the democratic legitimacy of a rights 
foundationalist constitution along such lines, Barnett provides an alternative conception 
of popular sovereignty: rather than collective majority or supermajority popular 
  
61  Barnett, above n 60, at 15; see also Randy E Barnett Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004) at ch 1. 
62  Barnett, above n 60, at 15. 
63  See Barnett Restoring the Lost Constitution, above n 61, at 11; see also discussion of a “good enough” 
constitution in Ackerman Foundations, above n 10 at 296-297. 
64  Barnett, above n 60, at 20-21. 
65  Barnett, above n 60, at 21. 
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sovereignty, Barnett puts forth the concept of the individual sovereignty of each person as 
the basis of constitutional legitimacy.66 The course of his argument is as follows: 
sovereignty rests not in the government, but in the People as individuals; for the 
government to be legitimate, it must receive the consent of all these sovereign 
individuals; however, literal unanimous consent by each person is essentially impossible, 
and in the absence of such, the only consent that can be attributed to all individuals is 
consent only to those powers that do not violate the fundamental rights of the People; 
protecting those rights retained by the People assures that government conforms to the 
consent it claims as the source of its powers; “only if such protection is effective will its 
commands bind in conscience on the individual.”67 
 
The need for rights to come before democracy in this way provide a serious critique of 
dualism: in a dualist democracy, the only way for rights to make it into higher law is 
through the higher lawmaking process.68 But if this does not occur, they cannot act as a 
constraint on ordinary lawmaking in the dualist system.69 This is problematic, as it is easy 
to see how minority rights may be overlooked by the majority in their higher lawmaking 
efforts: for example, the institution of slavery was shielded by the Founder’s 
Constitution.70 But if every person within a polity is to be subjected to the powers of 
government (as they are), the constitution must arguably be seen to protect every person, 
and allow every person a place and a voice as part of the People. 
 
E Conclusions: a Theoretical Framework for Assessing Constitutional Democratic 
Legitimacy, and the Need for Contextual Focus 
Ackerman’s preferred constitutional model is dualist democracy, and his case in favour of 
dualism is largely built by contrasting it to other major constitutional models: he 
considers that dualism avoids the democratic weaknesses of both monism and rights 
  
66  Barnett, above n 60, at 21-26. 
67  Barnett, above n 60, at 21-26, in particular at 26. 
68  See Ackerman, above n 10, at 12-13. 
69  See Ackerman, above n 10, 12-13. 
70  See Ackerman, above n 10, at 13-14. 
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foundationalism. Ackerman’s position, however, cannot be indiscriminately accepted at 
face value, as has been shown by some of the criticisms lodged against his dualist 
democracy. Thus the possible fallibility of Ackerman’s thesis must be acknowledged, as 
must the difficulties involved in attempting to meaningfully and definitively theorise 
constitutional democratic legitimacy. The constitutional models Ackerman refers to each 
have valid but alternative claims to democratic legitimacy, depending on how that term is 
defined, and in addition highlight the democratic weaknesses of each other: there is no 
one model that emerges as definitively superior of more democratically legitimate than 
the others. Thus the utility of Ackerman’s theory for this paper lies in its facilitation of a 
conversation about how to define democratic legitimacy in constitutional terms. Part III 
uses this conversation as a theoretical framework through which to assess the democratic 
legitimacy of New Zealand’s constitution, and offer reform options, through the lenses of 
alternative constitutional models. 
 
Before this, however, one final point must be acknowledged. Given that no one 
constitutional model emerges as democratically superior, the focus must move to the 
question of the superiority of any model for a particular constitutional context, and the 
potential that each model, or a combination of aspects of more than one model, may 
provide for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of that particular constitution. Thus the 
theoretical framework may be used to provide alternative suggestions for constitutional 
reform; the course that is chosen as superior must be tailored to the unique context of the 
constitution in question: here, New Zealand. 
 
Given this, it is important to recognise that, in addition to legal rules and principles, 
cultural values are also a significant part of a constitution, and serve to inform the 
viability of any potential constitutional reforms.71 As Matthew Palmer has argued:72  
 
  
71  Palmer, above n 2; see also Constitutional Advisory Panel New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a 
Conversation (Ministry of Justice, November 2013) at 11. 
72  Palmer, above n 2, at 567. 
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The nature of constitutional norms, and the constitutional culture from which they 
arise, forms a landscape that influences the likely success or failure, or at least the 
relative ease or difficulty of acceptance, of any constitutional reform. 
 
This is, in itself, an idea with democratic foundations: the constitutional values of the 
People, how they wish to be governed and what they expect from government, must 
inherently inform constitutional arrangements and developments. Thus for any 
constitutional analysis or suggestions for reform to be useful and valuable, recognition 
and understanding of the constitutional values of the People in question must always sit 
in the background. This leaves the task of trying to determine how to enhance a 
constitution’s democratic legitimacy while remaining faithful to the constitutional values 
of its populace. The following sections explore the place of New Zealand’s constitution 
within the above theoretical framework, raise weaknesses from the perspectives of the 
different models of democratic legitimacy, and offer suggestions for reform. Sitting in the 
background remains the recognition of the need for contextual focus, and an articulation 
of New Zealand’s constitutional values will be interwoven throughout. 
 
III New Zealand’s Position Within the Theoretical Framework: a 
Sophisticated Monist Constitution 
A Background 
As mentioned earlier, in terms of Ackerman’s framework, New Zealand’s constitution 
fits most neatly within the monist conception of democracy.73 New Zealand inherited the 
Westminster system of government from Britain upon colonisation, and since then there 
has been no formal break in New Zealand’s constitutional commitment to parliamentary 
sovereignty,74 by which is meant that Parliament has full legal power to make or unmake 
  
73  See Janet McLean “The New Zealand Constitutional Review: Tradition and Change” (paper presented 
to New Zealand Centre for Public Law Conference: “Unearthing New Zealand’s Constitutional 
Traditions”, Wellington, August 2013) at 3-6. 
74  See Palmer, above n 2, at 582. 
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any law it sees fit, and no body or court has legal power to override legislation enacted by 
Parliament.75  
 
As a result of this commitment to parliamentary sovereignty, there is no legal distinction 
within New Zealand’s constitution between ordinary and ‘constitutional’ laws: all laws 
promulgated by Parliament have the same legal status.76 Thus New Zealand has no 
written, supreme, entrenched constitutional document that can be used to strike down 
ordinary legislation as ‘unconstitutional’. Instead, New Zealand’s constitution can be 
described as ‘unwritten’.77 It is made up of an array of “written rules, institutional 
structures, procedures and norms, and understandings” that all, in conjunction, work 
together to determine our constitutional structure and circumscribe (either legally or 
extra-legally) the exercise of public power.78  
 
Given this, New Zealand has “relatively open-textured constitutional arrangements” with 
the result that “New Zealand has an iterative constitution – it is in a state of constant 
evolution.”79 Thus, unlike the United States Constitution, whereby onerous amendment 
procedures mean that constitutional change often involves a build up of pressure for 
change eventually released in the form of formal entrenched amendments (or, according 
to Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, informal sharp breaks from previous 
constitutional regimes), constitutional change in New Zealand is much more fluid and 
incremental, characterised more by a slow evolution of constitutional attitudes and 
  
75  Constitution Act 1986, s 15(1); Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2); see also A V Dicey Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution (3rd ed, MacMillan and Co, London, 1889) at 38; but see, for 
discussions on potential modern limits on parliamentary sovereignty, Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of 
Rights after Twenty-One Years: the New Zealand Constitutional Caravan Moves On?” (2013) 11 
NZJPIL 257; and Sian Elias “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round” 
(2003) 14 PLR 148. 
76  See generally Dicey, above n 75, at 84. 
77  See Matthew Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional 
realism and the importance of public office-holders” (2006) 17 PLR 133 at 135. 
78  Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government 
(4th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) at 3-4. 
79  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 5. 
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conventions and ad hoc pragmatic responses to issues as they arise.80 This can be viewed 
as the expression of the New Zealand cultural constitutional value of pragmatism, which 
tends to be favoured over theoretical or philosophical rhetoric in debates about our 
constitution.81 The unfortunate dark flipside of this pragmatism and constitutional fluidity 
is that there is potential for the constitution to change in undesirable ways without the 
public being aware of it.82 
 
Given New Zealand’s persistent commitment to monism (and, arguably, pragmatism), it 
is unsurprising that some of New Zealand’s most impressive constitutional achievements 
have been directed at the integrity of the electoral system itself, focusing more on 
improving our monist tradition rather than grand constitutional shifts.83 For example, 
efforts to entrench the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 as supreme law were 
resoundingly rejected at the time of proposal, being seen, inter alia, as an affront to 
parliamentary sovereignty and vesting too much power in the judiciary.84 A full 
discussion of constitutional developments in New Zealand is well beyond the scope of 
this paper, however there are two particular sophisticated monist achievements that shall 
be noted: the entrenchment provision in s 268 of the Electoral Act 1993, and the move to 
a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. 
 
B Section 268 Electoral Act 1993 
Section 268 of the Electoral Act is the only entrenchment provision of its kind on the 
New Zealand statute books.85 It entrenches one provision of the Constitution Act 1986 
and five provisions in the Electoral Act: s 17(1) of the Constitution Act, which sets the 
term of Parliament;86 s 28 of the Electoral Act, pertaining to the Representation 
  
80  Palmer, above n 2, at 574. 
81  Palmer, above n 2, at 566-567 and 590-591; See also Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of Rights after 
Twenty-One Years”, above n 75 at 261. 
82  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 5-6. 
83  See generally McLean, above n 73 at 3. 
84  See Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand (1986) AJHR I8A. 
85  McLean, above n 73, at 4. 
86  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1)(a). 
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Commission;87 ss 35 and 36 of the Electoral Act, pertaining to the division of New 
Zealand into electoral districts;88 s 74 of the Electoral Act, pertaining to qualification of 
electors to vote, as well as the definition in s 3 of ‘adult’;89 and s 168, pertaining to 
method of voting, in particular the secret ballot.90  
 
To amend or repeal any of these provisions, a 75 percent majority in the House of 
Representatives or an ordinary majority in a national referendum is required,91 technically 
placing these provisions out of reach of ordinary lawmaking processes. However, s 268 
does not entrench itself, meaning that it would be perfectly legal for the legislature to 
repeal s 268 through ordinary legislative processes, leaving the previously entrenched 
provisions similarly vulnerable to change through ordinary procedures92. The reason for 
only single entrenchment stemmed from doubts about the legal effectiveness of 
entrenchment in the context of parliamentary sovereignty.93 Nevertheless the provision 
has been complied with since its first enactment in 1956.94  
 
Section 268, and Parliament’s continued adherence to it, may be conceptualised, in 
Ackerman’s terms, as a sophisticated monist achievement.95 Section 268 purports to place 
limits on Parliament’s lawmaking authority, an arguably dualist aim in its recognition that 
some aspects of our constitution ought to be placed beyond the reach of ordinary 
lawmaking.96 Yet the limits pertain to the preservation of the integrity of the electoral 
process itself, and are thus arguably better conceived of as part of an ever more 
sophisticated monist constitution.97 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the different 
  
87  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1)(b). 
88  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1)(c)-(d). 
89  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1)(e). 
90  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1)(f). 
91  Electoral Act 1993, s 268(2). 
92  Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy (December 1986) at 290. 
93  Palmer, above n 75, at 276. 
94  Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 92, at 288. 
95  See Ackerman Foundations, above n 10, at 8. 
96  See generally Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 92, at 287; see generally Colón-
Ríos, above n 5, at 461-462. 
97  See Ackerman Foundations, above n 10, at 8; see also McLean, above n 73, at 4. 
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models are not mutually exclusive and may, in some respects, overlap. This observation 
may also be made with respect to the move to MMP voting in New Zealand. 
 
C Move to MMP voting 
The MMP voting system and the circumstances of its adoption are of particular note from 
a democratic standpoint. By way of background, prior to MMP New Zealand had a First 
Past the Post (FPP) voting system, where votes were for electorate seats; there was no 
party vote.98 The “winner-takes-all” nature99 of FPP meant that it had a “systemic bias in 
favour of a single party obtaining a majority of parliamentary seats”100 and consequently 
a “tendency to produce results that were disproportionate to voter intent.”101 The 
distortions were so extreme that in the 1978 and 1981 elections the National Party formed 
the government despite the Labour Party winning a larger share of the total vote on each 
occasion.102 Such a system, coupled with parliamentary sovereignty, raises issues from 
the perspective of democratic legitimacy: how can a government claim the authority of 
the People for even its ordinary lawmaking initiatives when voting outcomes are not 
reflective of voter intent? 
 
Thus confidence in New Zealand’s democratic system began to waiver in the 1980s and 
1990s, prompted in particular by the enactment of economic privatisation policies by 
successive National and Labour governments despite widespread popular 
dissatisfaction.103 Prior to its election in 1984, Labour undertook to establish a 
commission to review the electoral system, and established a Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System in 1985.104 The Commission undertook a comprehensive review of New 
  
98  See Electoral Commission “FPP – First Past the Post” <www.elections.org.nz>. 
99  See Charles Chauvel “A Better Democracy, Thanks to MMP” in Caroline Morris, Jonathan Boston 
and Petra Butler (eds) Reconstituting the Constitution (Springer, New York, 2011) 199 at 202; see 
Electoral Commission, above n 98. 
100  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 10. 
101  Chauvel, above n 99, at 202. 
102  Chauvel, above n 99, at 202-203. 
103  McLean, above n 73, at 3; Chauvel, above n 99, at 202-203; Ian Marsh and Ramond Miller 
Democratic Decline and Democratic Renewal: Political Change in Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) at 248-257. 
104  Chauvel, above n 99, at 203. 
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Zealand’s electoral system, considering many of the questions regarding democratic 
legitimacy that the constitutional models articulated in Part II are directed at: “How, for 
instance, is the balance to be struck between majority power and minority right, or 
between the sovereignty of the people exercised through Parliament and the rule of 
law…?”105 Furthermore, the Commission recognised that:106  
 
our Governments have great powers and great responsibilities. Their exercise of 
those powers and fulfillment of those responsibilities is legitimate only because it 
arises from the consent of the people, or, to put it another way, because it is based on 
the political sovereignty of the people. How is that consent to be given? How is that 
popular sovereignty to be exercised? 
 
After assessing the merits of a number of alternative electoral systems, the Commission 
recommended the adoption of MMP based on the criteria of fairness between political 
parties, effective representation of minority groups, effective Māori representation, 
political integration, effective representation of constituents, effective voter participation, 
effective government, effective Parliament, effective parties and legitimacy.107 
 
Unfortunately, Labour’s programme of constitutional reform ground to a halt in the late 
1980s as a result of factional infighting.108 National exploited this, making a promise in 
its 1990 election campaign to hold a referendum on New Zealand’s electoral system.109 
After gaining office, pressure on National to honour this promise resulted in a two-part 
referendum.110 An indicative referendum was held in 1992, asking voters if they wished 
to change the electoral system, and providing several options for reform.111 85% of voters 
were in favour of changing the electoral system, with 70% favouring MMP over the 
alternative options.112 Thereafter, in conjunction with the 1993 election, a second, 
binding, referendum was held, asking voters whether they wished to retain FPP or move 
  
105  Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 92, at 1.16. 
106  Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 92, at 1.18. 
107  Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 92, at 2.1; Chauvel, above n 99, at 203-204. 
108  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
109  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
110  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
111  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
112  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
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to MMP.113 MMP gained 54% of the vote, and took effect as New Zealand’s new 
electoral system from the 1996 election onwards.114 
 
This process of adoption of fundamental constitutional change was unheralded in New 
Zealand, and its democratic credentials are strong. Rather than slow incremental change, 
or change adopted through mere ordinary legislative means, change came about as a 
response to public dissatisfaction and through direct public participation. Again, this 
contains dualistic elements, as an embodiment of the idea that for constitutional change to 
be legitimate, it must be endorsed by the People. Further, the endorsement by the People 
has been continuous: in an indicative referendum held in conjunction with the 2011 
election, voters were asked whether they wished to keep MMP, with 57.8% voting yes.115  
 
Given this strong popular endorsement in favour of MMP, arguably an example of mass 
popular mobilisation (at least in Ackerman’s terms), it could be argued that New 
Zealand’s voting system should be viewed as higher law, that it would be democratically 
illegitimate, and should be illegal, for it to be overturned through ordinary lawmaking 
procedures. This may be an attractive argument if New Zealand’s constitution was more 
dualist in nature. However, given our monist underpinnings, the move to MMP seems 
better conceptualised as an extremely sophisticated monist achievement, particularly with 
its focus on enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the electoral system itself and 
making it more responsive to the will of the People, thus strengthening the democratic 
legitimacy of our constitution in monist terms. In our monist context, if a government 
were to legislate to overturn MMP without the consent of the People, it would likely face 
outrage by the People, and would hopefully be turned out of office at the next election 
(assuming the electoral changes it made allowed this; if not, a more dire situation, e.g. 
constitutional crisis, may arise). 
 
  
113  Chauvel, above n 99, at 204. 
114  Chuavel, above n 99, at 204. 
115  Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System (29 October 2012) at 6. 
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The s 268 entrenchment provision and the move to MMP arguably both display slight 
dualistic tendencies, the former in terms of purporting to act as a constraint on ordinary 
lawmaking, the latter in terms of its adoption being endorsed by the People. However, 
both efforts were focused on the electoral system itself, on preserving and enhancing its 
democratic integrity, and furthermore both operate within a predominantly monist 
context. On Ackerman’s analysis, they are thus most accurately conceptualised as 
achievements of a sophisticated monist constitution. Nevertheless, this may suggest that 
the dichotomy between the values represented by dualism and monism respectively are 
less delineated than Ackerman appears to acknowledge. 
 
IV Democratic Imperfections and Suggestions for Reform 
Part III has purported to show some of New Zealand’s achievements in constitutional 
democratic legitimacy, in the form of a particularly sophisticated monist constitution. 
Nevertheless, there remains room for improvement. New Zealand’s constitution may be 
critiqued from the perspectives of monism, dualism, and rights foundationalism. The 
following undertakes such a critique, offering suggestions for reform. Unfortunately, the 
scope of this paper is insufficient to provide an in depth discussion of possible reform 
options. Instead, it will pay deference to the work of the Electoral Commission as well as 
constitutional law academics whose work has been dedicated to such questions. 
 
A Monist Imperfections: Remaining Flaws in the Electoral System 
As a result of the vote in favour of MMP in the 2011 referendum on New Zealand’s 
electoral system,116 the Electoral Commission was required by law to commence a review 
of MMP, and make recommendations to improve MMP.117 In its report, the Electoral 
Commission stated that in undertaking the review, it remained mindful that, inter alia, “a 
voting system should be as fair, equitable and simple as possible to facilitate public trust, 
understanding and participation.”118 The Electoral Commission’s report noted a number 
  
116 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 74. 
117 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 75; see also Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 7. 
118 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 7. 
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of remaining flaws in the MMP system.119 Of particular interest, from the perspective of 
accurate representative democracy and thus sophisticated monism, is its recommendation 
that the one electorate seat waiver to the party vote threshold should be abolished.120  
 
The one electorate seat waiver is the rule that if a party obtains one electorate seat in an 
election, it gets an allocation of list seats proportionate to its share of the party vote, even 
if it has not crossed the party vote threshold (which is 5% of the party vote in New 
Zealand).121 It has been viewed by the original Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System as their one mistake.122 The one electorate seat waiver is problematic because it 
has been exploited to game the outcomes of elections. Rather than the electorate vote 
being used for its purpose, which is to elect a local representative, it has been used “to 
significantly influence the make-up of Parliament by helping to bring in list MPs who 
would not otherwise be elected.”123  
 
The controversial ‘cup of tea’ between John Key and John Banks in Epsom in the lead up 
to the 2011 election is an example of such electoral manipulation. It was seen as an 
indication to Epsom National voters to use their electorate vote to vote, not for the 
National candidate in Epsom, but for the ACT candidate John Banks.124 This would allow 
ACT to bring in list MPs in addition to Mr Banks, acting as extra support for a National 
government.  
 
This type of election gaming is not consistent with the type of representative democracy 
that MMP is supposed to produce and protect. It gives some voters (those in controversial 
electorates) disproportionate influence on the makeup of Parliament, undermining the 
principle of equality between voters inherent in our voting system, and produces 
  
119 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115. 
120 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115 at 8 and at 16-24. 
121 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 16. 
122 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 16. 
123 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 18. 
124 See Adam Bennett “Political cups of tea shared” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 11 November 
2011); a similar gaming technique was also used in the 2008 election: see Report of the Electoral 
Commission, above n 115, at 18. 
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disingenuous results.125 The Commission recommended that this rule be abolished: 
winners of electorate seats should keep their seats, but their party should not be entitled to 
a waiver of the 5% threshold for proportional representation.126 
 
This recommendation is but one way to improve our electoral system, and thus strengthen 
our monist democracy. The Commission recognised others. Electoral improvements were 
also considered in the 2011-2013 constitutional review.127 A comprehensive analysis of 
all the ways our electoral system could be tweaked and improved is beyond the scope of 
this paper. The above has purported to recognise but one issue of particular concern. At 
this point the question must be asked whether, even if our electoral system were perfect, 
even if our monist constitution was as sophisticated as possible, this would be sufficient 
for our constitution to claim that it was sufficiently democratically legitimate. Or, in other 
words, does our constitution need elements of a dualist character to supplement our 
monist commitments to enrich our constitution’s claims to democratic legitimacy? 
 
B Dualist Imperfections: Absence of Avenues for Binding Public Constitutional 
Participation 
Given New Zealand’s monist tradition, the author does not purport to argue that New 
Zealand should drastically change its constitutional arrangements and move towards an 
entrenched, supreme, written constitution, considering that this would ride roughshed 
over New Zealand’s constitutional values. Rather, the concern here is whether 
parliamentary sovereignty may be supplemented with avenues for binding public 
constitutional participation. 
 
Currently, there are no such legal avenues. The People can initiate referenda, but these 
are non-binding.128 Further, the 2011-2013 Constitutional Review, which purported to 
engage the People in a conversation about the constitution, had no legal avenue for its 
  
125 See Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 17-19. 
126 Report of the Electoral Commission, above n 115, at 16-19 
127 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 71, at 57-66 and 72. 
128 See Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. 
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recommendations to be implemented. This absence of legal avenues for binding public 
constitutional participation, beyond general elections, may be problematic from a 
democratic perspective. If Parliament is sovereign, and the only means of public control 
of Parliament is at the polling booths, this means that Parliament may do as it wishes in 
the three years between elections. Even if Parliament is as representative as possible (i.e. 
if the electoral system is perfected), this lack of binding public participation means that 
the People have very little control over their constitution. This raises issues from the 
perspective, generally, of constitutional democratic legitimacy stemming from the 
People. Furthermore, it is possible that if the People feel like they are not the authors of 
their constitution, they are more likely to disengage from constitutional participation. 
 
Joel Colón-Ríos has argued that two principles are inherent in the idea of democratic 
legitimacy focused on the concept of self-government: democratic openness and popular 
participation.129 Democratic openness requires that a democratic society must be an open 
society where “even the most fundamental rules are susceptible of being reformulated or 
replaced.”130 Popular participation requires that “those subject to a set of rules must have 
the opportunity to deliberate and decide on their content through the most participatory 
mechanisms possible.”131 He considers that the concept of ‘constituent power’ 
encapsulates these two principles.132 Constituent power is “the faculty of creating and 
recreating constitutions at will, a faculty generally attributed to the people in a 
democracy”;133 it always “remains alongside and above the constitution”.134 From these 
ideas, Colón-Ríos extracts two criteria for democratic legitimacy, the first of which is 
relevant for purposes here: the criterion that “a democratically legitimate constitution 
must provide an opening for constituent power to manifest from time to time.”135 He 
  
129  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 451-452. 
130  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 451. 
131  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 452. 
132  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 452. 
133  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 452. 
134  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 453, citing Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 2008) at 125-126. 
135  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 456. 
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submits that currently “New Zealanders lack the proper means to exercise their 
constituent power.”136 
 
Even if we wish to remain generally committed to monism, the idea that there ought to be 
avenues for the People to determine New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, if they 
so choose, remains attractive. It may be the case that the People get fed up with our 
current constitutional arrangements, wanting to alter small aspects of it or change it 
fundamentally. That desire may not exist currently, but if it did arise, there is currently no 
avenue for its expression in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. Arguably such 
an avenue should be an option before it is required, to avoid fundamental constitutional 
change from having to occur through revolutionary means. 
 
This does not mean that New Zealand must move towards a dualist constitution proper. 
There are other ways constituent power can be recognised that may supplement New 
Zealand’s monist constitutional structure with dualist elements. Colón-Ríos offers the 
solution of a Citizen Initiated Constituent Assembly.137 How this would work could be 
that citizens could propose constitutional change, and on the basis of that proposal be 
required to collect signatures to trigger an initial popular referendum.138 If enough 
signatures were obtained (with perhaps the number of required signatures being set at 
around 10-20% of registered voters), a referendum would be triggered in which citizens 
would be asked whether they wish to convene a Constituent Assembly to deliberate on 
the proposed changes.139 If the referendum vote is positive, the assembly would be 
convened.140 This assembly could be composed of elected delegates or delegates selected 
by random lot; ideally current or running politicians would be barred from sitting as 
delegates.141 The assembly would then deliberate on the proposed changes for a 
determinate period of time, following which any changes it proposed being subject to a 
  
136  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 467. 
137  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 467-468. 
138  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 467-468. 
139  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 468. 
140  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 468. 
141  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 468-469. 
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binding national referendum.142 If the assembly’s proposals are ratified by the public, 
they would then become law, and protected from ordinary lawmaking processes.143 
 
C Rights Foundationalist Imperfections: The Constitutional Place of the Treaty of 
Waitangi 
Thus far this paper has been conspicuously silent on the Treaty of Waitangi and its place 
in New Zealand’s unique constitution. This is not because the Treaty is constitutionally 
unimportant; on the contrary, it is because the Treaty is so important to New Zealand’s 
constitution that the scope of this paper is insufficient to adequately explore the 
constitutional significance of it. However, the following purports to briefly canvas the 
Treaty’s current constitutional status, and offer criticisms of that insufficient status from a 
rights foundationalist perspective. 
 
The Treaty itself does not have the status of domestic law: it does not have ordinary 
statutory effect, nor does it act as a restraint on parliamentary sovereignty as fundamental, 
supreme constitutional law.144 However, its significance has begun to be increasingly 
recognised in New Zealand’s constitution.145 For example, the Treaty has become an 
important influence on executive and legislative decision-making: the Cabinet Manual 
requires that Cabinet papers identify the Treaty implications of proposed policy 
recommendations and all executive proposals for legislation must report on consistency 
with the principles of the Treaty.146  
 
  
142  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 469. 
143  Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 469-470. 
144  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 346. 
145  See Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 346-347; see also Parliamentary Counsel Office “LAC 
Guidelines Chapter 5: Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” <www.pco.parliament.govt.nz>; see also 
Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 2008) at 244-277. 
146  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 346; Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [7.60]-[7.61]. 
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However, the exact constitutional place of the Treaty is uncertain.147 There are arguments 
that even the increased recognition of the Treaty in the constitution is insufficient, and 
that the Treaty or its principles should have constitutional protection, given that “the 
Treaty is a key source of the New Zealand Government’s moral and political claim to 
legitimacy in governing the country.”148 
 
The cession of sovereignty by Māori as tangata whenua of Aotearoa to the British Crown 
was not unconditional.149 David Williams conceives of the Treaty as a compact in which 
Māori welcomed those who wished to settle here, but with that welcome came an 
obligation on the Crown to “honour the collective rights of the indigenous people.”150 
 
When the Treaty is conceived of as a foundational document of New Zealand’s 
constitution,151 and as ceding sovereignty in return for protection of collective rights 
retained by Māori, this gives grounds for the rights foundationalist argument that Māori 
rights should be protected from abrogation by ordinary democratic means. This argument 
is strengthened by the fact that presently Māori are a minority of the New Zealand 
population, and are thus particularly vulnerable to the ‘tyranny of the majority’,152 but 
had colonisation not taken place, they would not have this minority status. There are 
therefore arguments that the Treaty should have special constitutional recognition, for 
example as some kind of legal constraint on parliamentary sovereignty.153 
 
V Conclusion 
 
Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional theory and the criticisms it has provoked provides a 
theoretical framework through which the democratic legitimacy of particular 
  
147  Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 145, at 277. 
148  Palmer and Palmer, above n 78, at 346. 
149  David Williams “The Treaty of Waitangi: A ‘Bridle’ on Parliamentary Sovereignty?” (2007) 22 
NZULR 598 at 600. 
150  Williams, above n 149, at 610. 
151  See McLean, above n 73, at 7. 
152  See Williams, above n 149, at 620. 
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constitutions may be assessed, by reference to the principles underlying monism, 
dualism, or rights foundationalism. These constitutional models each have unique and 
alternative claims to constitutional democratic legitimacy, with none emerging as 
definitively democratically superior to the others. In this context, the propriety of 
constitutional design or reform from the perspective of democratic legitimacy must be 
considered with reference to the constitutional values of a particular populace. 
 
New Zealand sits most comfortably within the monist constitutional model. Although 
New Zealand’s monism may be particularly sophisticated, there remains room for 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of New Zealand’s constitution. This may be in the 
form of perfecting the electoral system, and thus perfecting New Zealand’s monism. 
However, arguably this is not enough to truly enrich the democratic legitimacy of New 
Zealand’s constitution. There may be room within New Zealand’s constitution to 
embrace dualist elements, for example by a mechanism such as a Citizen Initiated 
Constituent Assembly, without undermining New Zealand’s general monist 
commitments. Furthermore, from a rights foundationalist perspective and its alternative 
view on democratic legitimacy, it may be necessary for greater recognition of the Treaty 
relationship and the role of Māori within constitutional arrangements and participation. 
 
Ideally, all of the criticisms raised would be addressed moving forward, so that New 
Zealand’s constitution can be said to be richly and meaningfully democratic, one that we 
can be proud of and meaningfully participate within. Most fundamental, however, is the 
need for We the People to remember that it is We who give government its legitimacy to 
rule, and We the People who retain the power to choose how We want our constitution to 
operate. 
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